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SHOULD STATEMENTS MADE BY
PATIENTS DURING PSYCHOTHERAPY
FALL WITHIN THE MEDICAL TREATMENT
HEARSAY EXCEPTION?
AN INTERDISCIPLINARY CRITIQUE
PHILIP K. HAMILTON*

I.

INTRODUCTION

In recent years, courts have permitted juries to consider
hearsay testimony about what patients have said to their
psychotherapists. In the typical case, the therapist testifies to
statements made by the patient during therapy sessions, and this
testimony is admitted in evidence "to prove the truth of the matter
asserted" in the statements. That is, the jury is invited to treat
the patient's statements, as related by the therapist, as true. Such
testimony would ordinarily be barred by the rule against hearsay.
Judges admit it by resorting to a longstanding hearsay exception
that is based on certain assumptions about the accuracy of
statements made by patients who are seeking treatment for
physical injuries and illnesses. However, those assumptions do
not apply to mental health problems and their treatment. Due to
to
statements
patient
of psychotherapy,
nature
the
psychotherapists often do not communicate objectively accurate
information. The failure of judges to understand this has led to
the widespread introduction of evidence that can undermine the
reliability of trials, when, as is often the case, the patient's
hearsay statements are significant evidence.
The rule against hearsay generally prohibits the receipt in
evidence of statements made out of court if those statements are
offered as evidence of the truth of the facts that they assert. The
purpose of the rule is to guarantee a certain degree of reliability in
the evidence that the jury is asked to consider. Testimony about
* Professor of Law, New England School of Law; 154 Stuart Street,
Boston, MA 02116; telephone: 617-422-7220; e-mail: phamilto@faculty.nesl.
edu. I would like to thank Dr. Michael Furstenberg, Dr. Irwin Avery and Dr.
Mary Sheldon for their assistance in assuring the accuracy of the article's
discussion of mental health treatment. I would also like to thank my
colleagues Lawrence Friedman, Judith Greenberg, David Siegel and Joelle
Moreno for their generosity in commenting on drafts.
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out-of-court statements is excluded because, if admitted, the jury
would be allowed to treat those statements as having the same
evidentiary importance as the testimony of a witness testifying in
court, yet the person who makes the statement, the hearsay
declarant, is not subject to the trial's testimonial safeguards when
he makes the statement. That is, unlike the witness who testifies
in court, the declarant is not under oath and is not subject either
to cross examination regarding the statement or to the jury's
evaluation of his demeanor when determining whether he might
be lying, jesting or mistaken about what he has said. Given that
the statement was made without those particular safeguards, the
out-of-court statement is considered less reliable than the
testimony of an in-court witness, presumptively too unreliable to
be admitted in evidence. The importance of the hearsay rule as a
guarantor of reliability was considerably increased by the
Supreme Court's 2004 decision in Crawford v. Washington,' which
held that the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment does
not require a separate judicial determination of the reliability of
hearsay
evidence that is offered against the defendant in criminal
2
trials.
Of course the hearsay rule does not bar all out-of-court
statements. Some such statements are obviously more reliable
1. 541 U.S. 36, 52 (2004).
2. Id. at 51-52. Until 2004, the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth
Amendment was understood to require either the production of the out-ofcourt declarant for cross-examination or a separate determination by the judge
that the proffered hearsay was reliable. In Crawford, the court concluded that
the clause does not prohibit the prosecution's use of unreliable hearsay, but
instead prohibits its use of "testimonial" hearsay. Although the court declined
to define "testimonial," most statements made in psychotherapy would not fit
into even the most expansive formulation cited in the opinion: "statements
that were made under circumstances which would lead an objective witness
reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for use at a later
trial." Crawford, 541 U.S. at 52 (citing Amicus Brief of National Association of
Criminal Defense Lawyers). Certainly, some statements made for the purpose
of mental treatment could be "testimonial" under this formulation. For
example, sexual assault treatment is often provided by a team of medical
professionals who are trained to fulfill the dual role of treatment provider and
evidence collector, and it is possible that statements made by sexual assault
victims in that context could be considered "testimonial." See OFFICE ON
VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, A National Protocol for

Sexual Assault Medical Forensic Examinations: Adults /Adolescents, 23-26
(2004) (describing the coordinated team approach to the sexual assault
medical forensic examination process). However, aside from sexual assault
treatment, it is very unusual for mental health treatment to be provided in
other circumstances that would lead the patient to believe that the statements
would be used in a later criminal prosecution. See Christina L. Lewis,
Comment, The Explotation of Trust: The PsychotherapistPatient Privilege in
Alaska as Applied to Prison Group Therapy, 18 ALASKA L. REV. 295 (2001)
(explaining the confidentiality of the patient-therapist relationship as the
foundation for successful psychotherapy).
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than others, and all jurisdictions recognize exceptions to the
hearsay prohibition. Nearly all of those exceptions are based on
the same rationale: The circumstances in which the statement was
made provide "guarantees of trustworthiness."' For example, a
statement in a business record has greater evidentiary reliability
because the business that produced the record relies on the
accuracy of such statements in conducting its regular activities.4
Similarly,
a
statement
acknowledging
the
declarant's
indebtedness, or his fault in an accident, is likely to be accurate
because most people do not make such "declarations against
interest" unless they are "satisfied for good reason that they are
true."5 The probable reliability of the out-of-court statement is
enhanced by such circumstances, and therefore the statement is
allowed to be received in evidence in spite of the fact that it was
made without the usual benefits of the testimonial protections of
an oath, cross examination and the opportunity for the jury to
observe the speaker's demeanor.
One of the most widely recognized of such hearsay exceptions
allows the admission of statements made for the purpose of
obtaining medical treatment for an injury or an illness. It is
thought that a patient seeking treatment will speak truthfully and
carefully because an inaccurate communication might result in
ineffective or damaging treatment. This motivation to speak
accurately, which Professor Mosteller has aptly called the "selfish
treatment interest,"6 is the "guarantee of trustworthiness" that
underpins this hearsay exception. The exception is limited to
those of the patient's statements that pertain directly to the
treatment sought, because the motive to speak truthfully and
carefully applies only to that limited class of factual assertions.7
Thus, the patient's recitation of such facts as the type of pain, its
location and its time of onset will be covered by the exception, and
3. FED. R. EVID. Article VIII advisory committee's introductory note: The
Hearsay Problem.
4. FED. R. EVID. 803(6) and advisory committee's note.
5. FED. R. EVID. 804(3) and advisory committee's note.
6. Robert B. Mosteller, Child Sexual Abuse and Statements for the Purpose
of Medical Diagnosisor Treatment, 67 N.C. L. REV. 257, 259 (1989).
7. A typical formulation of the exception is that of Rule 803(4) of the
Federal Rules of Evidence:
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the
declarant is available as a witness:

(4) STATEMENTS FOR PURPOSES OF MEDICAL DIAGNOSIS OR
TREATMENT.
Statements for purposes of medical diagnosis or
treatment and describing medical history, or past or present symptoms,
pain, or sensations, or the inception or general character of the cause or
external source thereof insofar as reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or

treatment.
FED. R. EVID. 803(4).
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will be admitted in evidence, whereas the patient's statements
that relate facts that are not pertinent to the treatment, such as a
description of the person who inflicted the injury, will be excluded
by the hearsay rule, unless covered by another exception.
This "medical treatment exception,"8 was originally limited to
statements made to physicians (and later to other medical
personnel) for the purpose of obtaining diagnosis and treatment of
physical injuries and ailments. However, in recent years it has
been extended, allowing the admission of statements made to
psychiatrists,
psychologists
and
other
practitioners
of
psychotherapy, such as social workers and counselors, for the
diagnosis and treatment of mental health problems.9 This Article
will argue that this extension of the exception to mental health
treatment is unwarranted and inadvisable and that it has resulted
from judges' misunderstanding of mental health treatment and
the role of patient statements in that treatment. The article will
examine the fundamentals of mental health treatment to show
that the use of patient statements in that treatment does not
produce the "guarantees of trustworthiness" that would justify
excusing such statements from the application of the hearsay
rule.'°
The earliest and still the most common application of the
medical treatment hearsay exception to admit statements made
for mental health purposes has been in child abuse cases, to

8. Professor Mosteller suggests, perhaps ironically, that "medical
examination exception" would be a more appropriate name for the exception as
it is used in child abuse cases, because of the widespread willingness of courts
to admit in those cases the statements of children sent to a pediatrician for a
second opinion and not for treatment. Id. at 47; see also Robert B. Mosteller,
The Maturation and Disintegrationof the Hearsay Exception for Statements
for Medical Examination in Child Sexual Abuse Cases, 65 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 47 (2002) (providing a detailed analysis of hearsay exceptions in child
sexual abuse cases). However, this scenario does not seem to occur in the
cases admitting adult statements and "medical treatment exception" properly
emphasizes the fundamental justification for the exception, the patient's
motivation to speak accurately because treatment is anticipated.
9. See Tracy A. Bateman, Annotation, Admissibility of Statements Made
for the Purposes of Medical Diagnosis or Treatment as Hearsay Exception
Under Rule 803(4) of the Uniform Rules of Evidence, 38 A.L.R. 5TH 433 (1996)
(collecting cases applying versions of Rule 803(4) to statements made for
mental health diagnosis or treatment).
10. The article does not argue that the unreliability of statements made in
mental health treatment is a reflection of any defect in mental health
treatment itself. Reliable treatment can result from unreliable statements
because, to a great extent, mental health treatment does not depend on the
accuracy of the information contained in the statements. Nor does the article
argue that statements made to mental health professionals without medical
degrees are less likely to be reliable than those made to doctors. This article's
argument applies to all such statements, regardless of the credentials or
training of the treating professional.
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enable examining medical personnel to testify to statements made
by alleged victims, usually when the victims themselves are
unable to testify due to their age or vulnerability. From there, it
has been but a short step for courts to extend the exception to
cover mental health statements when they are made by adults.
This Article will focus on statements by adults. Although the
arguments against applying the medical treatment exception to
mental health statements are the same regardless of whether the
declarant is an adult or a child, the exigencies of child abuse
prosecution can obscure the inappropriateness of using the
exception to admit a child victim's statements.
When the
declarant is an adult, the unsuitability of the exception is more
clearly evident. In addition, the widespread adoption of statutory
"tender years" hearsay exceptions 1 would seem to make it
increasingly unnecessary to resort to the medical treatment
exception in child abuse cases, whereas judges' inclination to apply
the exception to adults' statements is likely to remain strong.
Part II of this Article will provide some basic information
about mental health treatment, what it consists of and how it can
generate a wide range of statements that may be relevant in later
court proceedings. Part III will examine the reasons why a
patient's statements to a mental health provider, even when made
during the patient's treatment, are not reliable enough to escape
the ban against hearsay. Part IV will address the use of the
medical treatment exception to admit mental health statements
that are made for diagnosis only, without any view to treatment.
Part V will propose corrective measures.
II.

WHAT MENTAL HEALTH TREATMENT IS AND How IT CAN
PRODUCE A WIDE RANGE OF HEARSAY EVIDENCE

A. How Mental Health Treatment Is Delivered and the Kinds of
Statements That Are "ReasonablyPertinent"
The hearsay rule applies only to statements of fact. Because
of the nature of mental health practice, patients in psychotherapy
typically divulge far more facts than do patients seeking diagnosis
or treatment of physical problems.
The treatment of "mental" (i.e. emotional or behavioral)
disorders is now accomplished through a wide variety of

11. A "tender years" hearsay exception is tailored to admit statements
made by child victims of abuse under certain circumstances commonly
encountered in abuse cases. Most states have adopted such an exception,
either by statute or by rule. See Andrea D. Blohm, Comment, State v.
Hinnant:Limiting the Medical Treatment Hearsay Exception in Child Sexual
Abuse Cases, 79 N.C. L. REV. 1089, 1090 n.7 (2001) (providing a list of state

statutes and rules).
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therapies." Psychoanalysis is the original form of modern mental
health treatment. It usually consists of frequent sessions, several
times a week, between therapist and patient for periods of several
years. A psychoanalyst "helps the patient to recall and examine
events, memories and feelings from the past, many of them long
forgotten, as a means of helping the patient understand present
feelings and behavior and make changes as necessary."13 Thus, in
psychoanalysis facts about virtually any aspect of a patient's life
are likely to be discussed as an integral part of the treatment.
Although psychoanalysis is no longer one of the more common
forms of treatment, its influence continues in the practices of most
of the current "psychodynamic" or "talking" psychotherapies,
which are also characterized by a series of regularly scheduled
meetings in which the patient and therapist discuss the patient's
problems and feelings.14
Currently, many of the most commonly used psychotherapies
are short-term, extending for weeks or months, instead of the
multi-year periods that have characterized psychoanalysis.15 Some
of them are not talking therapies at all, and are far less likely to
be focused on the past. For example, Cognitive Behavioral
Therapy (CBT), now one of the most widely used therapies, is
directed exclusively to the here-and-now, helping the patient to
identify current, troubling (negative, dysfunctional) patterns of
thinking, and to modify those patterns." Although CBT and
similar short-term therapies are focused on the patient's current
condition rather than the events of his past, a patient in such

12. American Psychiatric Association, What Are the Most Common
Treatments Psychiatrists Use?, http://healthyminds.org/commontreatments
.cfm (last visited Nov. 13, 2007).
13. Id.
14. See generally Michael Bond, Psychodynamic Psychotherapy in the
Treatment of Mood Disorders, Current Opinion in Psychiatry, http://www.
medscape.com/viewarticle/519710 (last visited Nov. 13, 2007).
15. See Mark Olfson, Steven C. Marcus, Benjamin Druss & Harold Alan
Pincus, National Trends in the Use of Outpatient Psychotherapy, 159 AM. J.
PSYCHIATRY 1914, 1917 (2002) (reporting that in 1997 only 10.26% of
responding psychotherapy patients visited the therapist more than 20 times.).
16. See generally Holly Hazlett-Stevens & Michelle G. Craske, Brief
Cognitive-Behavioral Therapy: Definition and Scientific Foundations,
http://media.wiley.com/product data/excerpt/22/04700213/0470021322.pdf
(last visited Nov. 13, 2007). These authors explain that there are also
biomedical therapies, such as drug treatment, electroconvulsive therapy and

light therapy, all of which are increasingly used in the treatment of disorders
like depression and anxiety. Id. These are not psychotherapies at all and are
usually employed by medical doctors who may have little or no training in
psychiatry and who require little information from the patient beyond a
description of the patient's symptoms, their onset and their frequency.

Because they rely on such a small range of information from the patent, such
therapies are very unlikely to be the source of relevant hearsay evidence, and
the arguments in this article do not apply to them.
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therapy would still typically describe his symptoms by describing
his reactions in certain situations, often situations that involve
actions by others, such as, "I feel that way whenever my boss
reprimands me." Although the here-and-now psychotherapies do
not elicit as wide a range of facts from the patient as the talking
therapies do, the facts they do call forth are just as "reasonably
pertinent" to the treatment and could just as easily be relevant in
a subsequent legal proceeding.
In fact, the requirement of "reasonable pertinence" is not
much of a limitation on the admissibility of facts divulged in
psychotherapy. Many more facts are typically pertinent to the
treatment of a mental or emotional condition than would be the
case with a physical condition. When a patient consults an
ordinary medical provider, the patient's statements of fact either
will describe his symptoms, for instance, "I have a pain in my
stomach," or will recite facts that are not symptoms, such as time
of onset of the symptoms, the activities he was performing at the
time or onset and prior occurrences of the symptoms. Statements
of symptoms are almost always "reasonably pertinent to diagnosis
or treatment," and therefore admissible under the medical
treatment hearsay exception. Statements of symptoms are also
the most likely to be motivated by the selfish treatment interest,
since it is usually the symptoms from which the patient is seeking
relief.
It is the non-symptom facts that can be problematic and
require extra scrutiny. The hearsay exception in Rule 803(4)
permits the introduction of non-symptom facts of "medical history"
or of "the inception or general character of the cause" of the
symptoms, but only as long as they are "reasonably pertinent to
diagnosis or treatment." If a patient consults an internist about
his back pain, the fact that the pain began when he lifted a heavy
box will be "reasonably pertinent" to the treatment of his injury,
but probably not the fact that his boss asked him to lift the box
and certainly not the fact that his wife has threatened to leave him
if he does not change jobs. 7 In the diagnosis and treatment of
physical injuries and illnesses, the sets of facts that are
"reasonably pertinent" to the diagnosis or treatment are quite
limited, and in many such cases the limits are evident to a judge
as well as to the doctor.
But a much larger set of facts can constitute the "history" and
"cause" of a psychiatric disorder, and thus be "reasonably
pertinent to diagnosis or treatment." This is true both because of
the great variety of factors that may influence a mental condition 8
17. FED. R. EVID. 803(4) advisory committee's note.
18. See generally S.L. HALLECK, EVALUATION OF THE PSYCHIATRIC
PATIENT: A PRIMER 7 (PLENUM MEDICAL BOOK CO., SHERWYN M. WOODS ED.,
1991).
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and because the treatment of those conditions often must be based
an assessment of such variables as the patient's "physical status,
medical history, age, sex, education, family situation, intelligence,
legal status, personality traits, occupational status, psychological
mindedness, current levels of stress, previous treatment, and
previous patterns of achievement and motivation." 9 In traditional
medicine, the history necessary for diagnosis and treatment is
fairly limited to that immediately surrounding the presenting
symptoms, but the facts that are pertinent to the diagnosis and
treatment of mental conditions are far more diffuse, and can span
the patient's entire milieu. This is especially true in the "talking"
therapies.
Mental or emotional disturbance is often precipitated by
events, often involving perceived mistreatment of the patient, and
those events typically involve the actions of people other than the
patient himself. The patient's statements made to the treating
mental health professional are likely to include the patient's
version of such events. Those non-symptom facts are usually
considered by the therapist to be "reasonably pertinent to
diagnosis or treatment" of the patient and it is those facts, not the
patient's description of his symptoms, that are most likely to be
relevant in a subsequent legal action. Ordinarily, when a patient
seeking physical treatment makes statements of medical history,
and those statements are offered in evidence (e.g., in personal
injury cases, workers compensation cases, etc.) the facts that are
most relevant in the trial - usually to prove damages - are the

same facts that were most important to the diagnosis and
treatment of the physical condition, (e.g., nature and severity of
pain, its location, time of onset, apparent causes), and the patient's
expression of these facts is often the result of pointed questioning
by the doctor. When the mental health patient's statements of
history are offered in evidence, it is almost invariably the facts
about people and events (e.g., details of assault, relationship to
defendant, acts of co-workers, etc.) that are relevant. Although
pertinent to the patient's treatment, those facts were generally
much less central to the diagnosis or treatment of the patient's
mental condition than the patient's statements about his feelings
and his other symptoms, which are seldom of much probative
value in a trial.20 Thus, unlike in the medical-treatment situation,
the facts that are sought to be proven in court through a patient's
hearsay statements in mental health treatment tend to be
precisely those facts that are least likely to have been explored in
the treatment. Consequently, a great deal of patient history can be
19. Id. at 11.
20. See id. at 77 (stating that inaccuracy or incompleteness of information
related to the patient's history, as opposed to the patient's behavior, does not
carry a high risk of diagnostic error).
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characterized as "reasonably pertinent" to mental health
treatment even though neither patient nor clinician was much
concerned about its accuracy when the patient recited the history.
B. The Extent and Nature of Courts' Use of the Medical Treatment
Exception to Admit Statements Made in Mental Health Treatment
As already noted, the hearsay exception for statements made
for the purpose of medical diagnosis or treatment has been applied
most frequently to admit statements by child victims in
prosecutions for child sexual abuse. As one would expect, the
hearsay statements admitted in evidence in those cases were
overwhelmingly statements of non-symptom facts, such as the
child's description of the abuse and identification of the abuser.
This use of the exception appears to have begun in the 1980's,
when the scope of child sexual abuse was beginning to be
recognized," and it continues in sexual abuse cases to the present
day. " In those cases, the child victim had typically been examined
by a medical professional immediately after the abuse had been
discovered or alleged, and the child had described the abuse to the
professional. At the time of trial, the child was often unavailable
to testify because of age or fear of re-traumatization, and the
medical treatment exception was invoked to allow the professional
to testify to the child's statements.
If some of the child's
statements describing the incident were not directly pertinent to
the treatment of any physical injury, it was not unusual for courts
to admit them under the exception anyway, on the ground that
they were pertinent to treatment of the child's assumed
psychological injuries, even when the examining doctor or nurse
was not a mental health professional and there was no evidence
that the child actually received any psychological treatment.2
21. This development has been described and analyzed by Professor Robert
Mosteller in two comprehensive articles. See Mosteller, supra note 6, at 28183 (discussing problems related to the trustworthiness of psychological patient
hearsay statements); Mosteller, supra note 8, at 49.
22. See, e.g., State v. Anderson, 864 A.2d 35, 50 (2005) (holding statements
to pediatric nurse practitioner, ten days after medical exam, describing abuse
in detail, were admissible under the exception because "pertinent to proper
diagnosis and treatment of the resulting physical and psychological injuries of
sexual assault"); In re Kya, 857 A.2d 465, 472 (D.C. 2004) (finding "no error
whatever" in admitting statements to school nurse describing abuse and
identifying the perpetrator, because the statements were admissible under the
exception since they related to "the psychological and emotional consequences
of the abuse"). The resort to the medical treatment exception can be rendered
unnecessary by the adoption of a "tender years" hearsay exception, which
typically allows the admission of a child victim's statement in abuse cases
under certain commonly encountered circumstances. BLOHM, supra note 11,
at 1090 n.7.
23. This practice has been especially common in admitting the child's
hearsay statements identifying the abuser. Courts have been willing to admit
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It is easy to see the motivation for extending the medical
treatment exception to statements made by children under those
circumstances. Child sexual abuse is an abhorrent crime, the
child and the perpetrator are often the only witnesses to the abuse
and the child may be unable to testify because of age or possible
re-traumatization. The child's statements to an examining doctor
or nurse might be the only direct evidence of the crime or of the
perpetrator's identity. The use of the medical treatment exception
to admit the child's statements as pertinent to psychological
treatment, although subject to criticism, 4 has been widespread.
The concerns raised by the critics have been overwhelmed by the
urgent need for the evidence and the difficulty of putting the child
on the witness stand. In addition, proponents argue that certain
considerations peculiar to children enhanced the reliability of the
statements, considerations such as a child's assumed motivation to
speak truthfully to authority figures and a child's appreciation of
the serious purpose of the medical examination." The practice of
admitting the child's statements under the medical treatment
exception has been widespread. 6
That practice has led to a similar willingness to admit
statements made by adults during mental health treatment, with
reviewing courts often citing the child abuse cases as authority for
approving the admission of those statements. After all, under the
medical treatment exception the rationale for admitting a child's

such evidence, even while acknowledging that it is not pertinent to medical
treatment, on the ground that child abuse involves psychological injury and
the identification of the perpetrator is pertinent to treatment of those injuries.
See, e.g., United States v. Renville, 779 F.2d 430, 441 (8th Cir. 1985)
(statement made to a specialist in family practice); Hawkins v. State, 72
S.W.3d 493, 498 (Ark. 2002) (statement made to a "physician"); Galindo v.
United States, 630 A.2d 202, 211 (D.C. 1993) (statement made to a
pediatrician); State v. Vosika, 731 P.2d 449, 450 (Or. Ct. App. 1987)
(statement made to a pediatrician); State v. Rucker, 847 S.W.2d 512, 519
(Tenn. Ct. App. 1992) (statement made to an emergency room nurse); State v.
Butler, 766 P.2d 505, 520 (Wash. Ct. App. 1989) (statement made to a nurse);
Goldade v. State, 674 P.2d 721, 722 (Wyo. 1983) (statement made to a nurse).
24. See Mosteller, supra note 6, at 281-83 (criticizing the use of children's
hearsay statements as related to psychological treatment); John J. Capowski,
An Interdisciplinary Analysis of Statements to Mental Health Professionals
Under the Diagnosisor Treatment Hearsay Exception, 33 GA. L. REV. 353, 4057 (1999); Lynne Celander DeSarbo, The Danger of Value-Laden Investigation
in Child Sexual Abuse Cases: Are Defendants' ConstitutionalRights Violated
when Mental Health Professionals Offer Testimony Based on Children's
Hearsay Statements and Behaviors?, 2 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 276, 293-303 (1999);
Mosteller, supranote 8, at 48.
25. These assumptions regarding a child's motivation to speak accurately to
an examining physician are certainly not beyond dispute. However, that
dispute is beyond the scope of this article, which addresses only statements by
adults.
26. See generally Mosteller, supra note 8.
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statement is rooted in his status as a patient, not as a child, so
why should the same rationale not apply to an adult patient's
statement?
Also, although the admission of children's statements has
generally been limited to cases involving alleged abuse and to
statements describing the abuse, adult statements have been
admitted in a far greater variety of cases.
In homicide cases, courts have used the exception to admit
the victim's descriptions of prior violence by the defendant, made
in treatment for emotional problems,27 the victim's description of
the crime, made in an emergency room evaluation for
psychological trauma,28 the defendant's statements to a jail
psychiatrist, offered to rebut the defendant's later claim of
remorse, 29 a videotape of the defendant's reenactment of the crime,
made in the course of psychiatric evaluation,"° the victim's
description of her prior suicide attempts, offered by the defendant
as evidence that the victim's death was a suicide,31 and statements
of the victim, made in psychological treatment for anxiety and
depression, describing the defendant's sexual abuse of one's
daughter, offered to rebut the defendant's claim that the victim's
allegations of that abuse were untrue.32
In sexual assault cases, courts have used the exception to
admit the victim's description of the crime, made in post-incident
evaluation for psychological injury33 and in subsequent treatment
for psychological problems.34 In employment discrimination cases,
courts have used the exception to admit the plaintiffs statements
describing harassment by supervisors and fellow workers, made in
subsequent treatment for depression, anxiety and similar
emotional problems. 5
Courts have also admitted patient statements in cases
alleging witness tampering,36 tax fraud,37 domestic violence,"
27. See, e.g., Capano v. State, 781 A.2d 556, 611 (Del. 2001); State v.
Richards, 552 N.W.2d 197, 209 (Minn. 1996); State v. Evans, 992 S.W.2d 275,
283 (Mo. App. S.D. 1999); State v. Wyss, 370 N.W.2d 745, 759 (Wis. 1985).
28. See, e.g., State v. Woods, 23 P.3d 1046, 1070 (Wash. 2001).
29. See, e.g., Cameron v. State, 988 S.W.2d 835, 852 (Tex. App. 1999).
30. See, e.g., State v. Yamada, 57 P.3d 467, 480 (Haw. 2002).
31. See, e.g., State v. Jaeger, 973 P.2d 404, 409 (Utah 1999).
32. See, e.g., State v. Wood, 545 A.2d 1026, 1031-32 (Conn. 1988).
33. See, e.g., United States v. Haner, 49 M.J. 72, 76 (C.A.A.F. 1998); People
v. Rogers, 780 N.Y.S.2d 393, 397 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004) (admitted under New
York business records exception, which allows admission of such statements
"as long as they are germane to medical diagnosis or treatment"); State v.
Janda, 397 N.W.2d 59, 63 (N.D. 1986).
34. See, e.g., State v. Geboy, 764 N.E.2d 451, 462 (Ohio Ct. App. 2001).
35. See, e.g., Swinton v. Potomac Corp., 270 F.3d 794, 808 (9th Cir. 2001);
Guzman v. Abbott Labs, 59 F. Supp. 2d, 747, 755 (N.D. Ill. 1999).
36. See, e.g., State v. Roberts, 622 A.2d 1225, 1233 (N.H. 1993).
37. See, e.g., U.S. v. Madoch, 935 F. Supp. 965, 965 (N.D. Ill. 1996).
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negligence,39 legal malpractice,40 and police brutality,41 all made in
treatment for psychological problems that followed the events from
which the litigation arose.
Reviewing courts seldom identify the mode of mental health
treatment that was employed when the patient's statements were
made, but as this brief review of cases demonstrates, regardless of
the type of treatment, the relevant statements were assertions of
non-symptom facts and were admitted because of their apparent
pertinence to the patient's treatment, though they were offered
primarily as evidence of the litigated incident itself. All of those
statements were hearsay and would have been inadmissible except
for the medical treatment exception. Most of them would not have
been admissible under that exception if the statement had been
made for the treatment of a physical condition. Facts such as prior
incidents of violence, the details of the crime, the quality of the
victim's relationship with the defendant, the actions of follow
workers, are simply not "reasonably pertinent" to the diagnosis or
treatment of physical illness or injury.
In approving the admission of such statements under the
medical treatment exception, reviewing courts typically recite a
rationale that simply equates psychological treatment with
medical treatment. Sometimes the rationale is accompanied by
some acknowledgment of problems of reliability in admitting
statements relating to mental health and an assurance that such
problems can be dealt with by rules providing for the exclusion of
any material that is unfairly prejudicial 2 (although it appears that
the statements are seldom if ever excluded for that reason, once
they are found admissible under the medical treatment exception).
Even courts that apply a more careful analysis,
acknowledging the differences between medical treatment and
psychological treatment, show little understanding of how those
differences can affect the reliability of the statements. An example
of this occurred in State v. Roberts,43 a 1993 decision of the New

38. See, e.g., State v. Cureton, C.A. No. 01CA3219-M, 2002 WL 31313120

(Ohio Ct. App. 2002).
39. See, e.g., Reed v. Abrahamson, 423 S.E.2d 491 (N.C. Ct. App. 1992);
Knor v. Parking Co. of Am., 596 N.E.2d 1059, 1063 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991).

40. See, e.g., Vallinoto v. DiSandro, 688 A.2d 830 (R.I. 1997).
41. See, e.g., Parker v. Town of Swansea, 310 F. Supp. 2d 356, 374 (D.
Mass. 2004).

42. An example of such a rule is Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence
which provides that:
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of
the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay,
waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.

FED. R. EVID. 403.
43. Roberts, 622 A.2d at 1225.
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Hampshire Supreme Court affirming a conviction for witness
tampering. The charges were filed in 1987, and the prosecution's
principal witness was to be a seventeen-year-old boy named Bryar
who had a history of drug and alcohol abuse." Earlier in 1987,
Bryar had been adjudicated delinquent and sent to a chemical
treatment facility for thirty days.45 While there, he underwent
counseling and disclosed to the counselor that he had a sexual
relationship with the defendant and had received cocaine and
money from the defendant in exchange for sex.46 After his
discharge, Bryar contacted the police and the defendant was
charged with obscenity, prostitution and conspiracy to acquire
cocaine." Five months later, Bryar was arrested for attempted
extortion of the defendant and he was placed in another
residential treatment program.48 In that program, he participated
in psychotherapy and told the treating psychologist that the
defendant had offered him a car, money and an apartment in
Canada if he would not testify in the defendant's trial on the
obscenity, prostitution and drug charges.49 Bryar subsequently
met with a police officer, and the defendant was indicted for
witness tampering.'O In 1988, before the witness-tampering trial,
Bryar committed suicide." In that trial, the judge allowed the
counselor and the psychologist to testify to Bryar's statements,
made to them, that the defendant had engaged in a sexual
relationship with Bryar and had given him money and cocaine in
exchange for sex and that the defendant had offered to give Bryar
a car, money and an apartment if he did not testify against him.52
Bryar's statements were admitted under New Hampshire's version
of the medical treatment exception to the hearsay rule, which
provides the same coverage as federal Rule 803(4), but requires, in
addition, that the court affirmatively find "that the proffered
statements were made under circumstances indicating their
trustworthiness."
The New Hampshire Supreme Court approved the admission
of those statements. It agreed with the trial court that Bryar's
general cooperation with the psychotherapy program indicated
that his purpose in making the statements was to receive
diagnosis and treatment for his chemical dependency and his
psychological problems, even though his placement in that
44. Id. at 1228.

45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

Id.
Id. at 1229.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1231.
Id. at 1230-32 (citing N.H.R.EVID. 803(4)).
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treatment was involuntary.'
As evidence of the pertinence of
Bryar's statements to his psychological treatment, the court relied
on the testimony of the counselor and the psychologist that the
disclosure of the sexual relationship and the defendant's
inducements were important in the treatment of Bryar's
problems." In determining the psychological pertinence of the
defendant's identity, the court cited child-abuse cases holding that
the identity of the perpetrator is pertinent to the treatment of
child abuse.56 The trial court had found that Bryar's statements
met the New Hampshire rule's requirement of trustworthiness
because Bryar had made the statements in confidence to persons
providing treatment, rather than to the police, that Bryar had an
"open and honest professional relationship" with both the
counselor and the psychologist, that Bryar "cried spontaneously for
twenty minutes" when he first admitted his sexual relationship
with the defendant, and that the acknowledgment of that
relationship placed Bryar "in a light where others may look
unfavorably upon him." 7 The reviewing court agreed, giving short
shrift to Bryar's motive to harm the defendant, evidenced by his
expression of desire to seek revenge for the defendant's treatment
of him and by the fact that he had actually been charged with
attempting to extort money from the defendant."
Similarly, in Capano v. State,59 the Supreme Court of
Delaware acknowledged that mental health treatment differs from
physical treatment, ° but failed to examine that difference in
holding that hearsay statements made in mental health treatment
could be admitted under the medical treatment exception. 6'
Capano was a murder prosecution. The defendant, a prominent
lawyer, was charged with killing a woman whom he had been
dating for two years prior to the murder. 2 In the trial, three
mental health professionals who had treated the victim for
anxiety, depression, anorexia and compulsive-obsessive disorder
were allowed to testify to statements that the victim had made to
them, including that she was fearful that the defendant would
harm her if she broke off the relationship, that she sought to end
the relationship because it was unhealthy, that the defendant was
incredibly controlling and possessive, that she was concerned that
the defendant would kidnap her, that the defendant had come to

54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

1232.
1233.
1232-33.
1230.
1237.

59. 781 A.2d 556 (Del. 2001).

60. Id. at 623-26.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 582-83.
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her apartment late at night, bolted the door shut and yelled at her
because she had begun to date someone else and that he was
unwilling to let her pull away from that relationship.'
One
mental health professional testified further that the victim had
said that the defendant had gotten into her apartment, became
very angry and threatened to take back gifts he had given her so
they would not be present while she dated someone else. 6
The trial court admitted all of this testimony, and the
Supreme Court affirmed the defendant's conviction, ruling that
those statements were admissible under the Delaware equivalent
of FRE 803(4), because they were reasonably pertinent to the
victim's mental health treatment. Acknowledging that "in some
cases statements of the patient made to the professional in the
course of psychodiagnosis or psychotherapy may be unreliable,
inappropriately far-ranging, or unduly prejudicial,"65 the court
emphasized the need for a firm foundation with respect to the
qualifications of the psychotherapist, and the application of the
two-part reliability test first developed in United States v. Iron
Shell,66 i.e., the declarant's motive must be consistent with the
purpose of promoting treatment, and doctors must reasonably rely
on this sort of information in diagnosis or treatment. It also
admonished trial courts to determine that the probative value of
the evidence was not substantially outweighed by the risk of
unfair prejudice.67 It concluded that, if these safeguards are
applied, "[W]e find no supportable reason why there should be a
blanket exclusion of statements made to psychotherapists as
compared to the general acceptance of statements made to doctors
or medical paraprofessionals for physical ailments."'
It would be hard to argue that the victim's descriptions in
Capano were not "reasonably pertinent" to her treatment for such
mental health problems as anxiety and depression. As we have
seen, and as the Capano court acknowledged, much of a patient's
life experience can be reasonably pertinent to his psychological
treatment. However, neither the qualifications of the therapist,
nor the patient's sincerity in seeking treatment, nor the
reasonableness of the therapist's reliance on the statements, the
"safeguards" proposed by the Capano court, have much bearing on
the factual accuracy of the information that the patient relays to
the therapist.

63. Id. at 606 n.119.
64. Id. at 612 n.141.
65. Id. at 624.
66. Id. at 624. In United States v. Iron Shell, 633 F.2d 77 (8th Cir. 1980),
the statements in question were those of a child victim of an attempted sexual
molestation, made to an examining physician.
67. Capano, 781 A.2d at 624.

68. Id. at 625.
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In highly charged cases like Roberts and Capano, where the
declarant has died and is therefore not available for cross
examination anyway, and where the defendant is arguably
responsible for the death, there will be an understandable
temptation to admit statements like these, which can be highly
relevant to the defendant's guilt. The medical treatment exception
is a convenient vehicle for pursuing that particular temptation.
Because it is a longstanding and familiar exception to the hearsay
rule, resorting to it appears to dispense with any need for further
examination of how reliable the statements truly are.
But in both Roberts and Capano, the victim's statements
describe a troubled relationship from the viewpoint of only one of
the participants. The accuracy of such descriptions, uttered in a
supportive setting that encourages emotional openness, can easily
be distorted by anger, resentment and a need for self-justification.
If the victim had been able to testify as a witness, the victim's
descriptions of the relationship, of the defendant and of the
incidents would surely have been probed and clarified by cross
examination. If the victim had made the statements to a friend, a
clergyperson, a police officer, or to anyone other than a mental
health professional, they would have been excluded as hearsay.
They are admitted in cases like Roberts and Capano only because
the court has assumed that the therapeutic setting ensures their
reliability.
But what is the source of this assumed reliability? From
what do patient statements in psychotherapy derive such a
"guarantee of trustworthiness" that they should be exempted from
the operation of the hearsay rule? Cases like Roberts and Capano,
which extend the exception to mental health treatment because it
applies already to medical treatment, are based on an assumption
that mental health treatment is the functional equivalent of
physical treatment, in that it inspires in the patient a comparable
motivation to speak carefully and accurately. That, however, is
not the case.
III. WHY HEARSAY STATEMENTS MADE FOR THE PURPOSE OF
MENTAL HEALTH TREATMENT ARE NOT SUFFICIENTLY RELIABLE TO
BE EXCEPTED FROM THE HEARSAY RULE
How reliable must a statement be to qualify for admission
under the medical treatment exception? Reliability, of course, is a
matter of degree, and the several hearsay exceptions admit
statements that vary in their likelihood of being accurate because
the circumstances in which the statements are made, and the
situations that provide their "guarantees of trustworthiness,"
differ. Yet, for all statements that are admitted under the medical
treatment exception, that "guarantee" is the same: It is the
patient's "selfish treatment interest," the perceived need to speak
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accurately in order to receive appropriate treatment (and relief
from the presenting symptoms). Whether the patient's statement
was made in mental health treatment or in treatment of a physical
malady, its reliability is predicated on the patient's strong
motivation to be truthful in order to receive the diagnosis and
treatment that will ultimately relieve the patient's suffering from
the malady.
So, in order for the exception to encompass a
statement made to a psychotherapist, it would seem that the
statement should be motivated by a "selfish treatment interest"
that is roughly the same as the interest that motivates a patient to
speak carefully and truthfully when undergoing treatment for a
physical malady. And in fact, the courts that have admitted
patient statements made in mental health treatment have
generally assumed that the patient does have the same kind of
selfish treatment motivation as the patient seeking treatment of a
physical injury.
That assumption, however, does not seem to be based on any
comparison of psychological and physical treatment methods or
even on a clear understanding of what transpires in mental health
treatment.
Even a cursory review of some basic texts on
psychological treatment suggests that the use of patient
statements in such treatment differs fundamentally from their use
in the treatment of physical conditions, and differs in ways that
directly affect the patient's motivation to speak truthfully and
accurately. This is true even though the statements may be very
"pertinent to diagnosis or treatment."
Statements that courts have admitted under the medical
treatment exception because they were pertinent to psychological
diagnosis or treatment have been made in three different settings.
The majority of such statements were made during the actual
course of psychological treatment by a mental health professional,
the setting that most closely resembles the exception's
paradigmatic patient-to-treating-medical-professional
situation;
this was the situation in Roberts and Capano, both described
above. Another significant group of admitted statements are those
that were made during medical (not psychological) treatment after
a traumatic experience. Those statements are usually admitted
through the testimony of the examining medical professional on
the ground that, when the statements were made, the medical
professional was not only treating the patient's physical injuries
but was also evaluating the patient for expected referral to mental
health services for treatment of any psychological injuries caused
by the traumatic event. This formulation has enabled the court to
admit statements containing facts, such as threats made by the
defendant and other aggravating circumstances of the crime, that
are not pertinent to the medical treatment that the professional
was actually performing but that may be pertinent to the
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diagnosis or the future treatment of the patient's mental condition.
The third setting from which patient statements have been
admitted is the situation in which a mental health professional is
examining the patient for a trial-related diagnosis (such as
diminished capacity or ability to stand trial), with no intention of
providing treatment.
This section will examine the patient's motivation to speak
carefully and truthfully in the first two situations, which give rise
to the "selfish-treatment interest" rationale for admitting the
patient's statements. Because the "diagnosis-only" statements are
admitted for an entirely different reason, they will be discussed
separately, in Part IV.
A. Statements Made During Mental Health Treatment
Statements made to a mental health professional during the
course of treatment would seem to be the functional equivalent of
the patient-to-doctor statements on which the medical treatment
exception was originally based. The patient knows he is in
treatment, he knows for what he is being treated and he probably
knows that his statements are related in some way to the
treatment. Of the three situations described above, this is the one
in which the patient's assertions seem most likely to be motivated
by his "selfish-treatment interest" and therefore most reliable.
But it is precisely in this treatment situation that the differences
between psychological treatment and physical treatment can most
clearly be seen to produce in the mental health patient a much
Following is an
reduced motivation to speak accurately.
examination of some of those differences and their effect on the
reliability of the patient's assertions.
1. The Goal of the Inquiry and the Role of the Clinician in the
Interview
The first such difference is in the focus of the interview itself.
A physician seeking to diagnose or treat a physical malady is
primarily interested in obtaining information about the objective
causes and symptoms of the presenting condition. The mental
health clinician, on the other hand, is most interested in a mutual
exploration, with the patient, of the patient's feelings associated
with the information the patient relates, not with the accuracy of
the information itself.69 Central to the clinician's ability to engage

69. See generally HALLECK, supra note 18 (intended for medical students
and psychiatric residents), JOHN SOMMERS-FLANAGAN & RITA SOMMERSFLANAGAN, CLINICAL INTERVIEWING (3d ed., John Wiley & Sons, 2003)
(intended for psychology students), LUCAS, SUSAN RIES, WHERE TO START AND
WHAT TO ASK: AN ASSESSMENT HANDBOOK (W.W. Norton & Co. 1993)
(intended for social work students).
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the patient in this exploration is the formation of a supportive
clinician-patient relationship. °
This difference in the goals of medical and psychological
interviewing results in very different participation by the
professional in the interview. A Dutch study several years ago
compared questioning techniques in initial medical and
It found that the typical medical
psychological interviews."
interview was characterized by pointed questioning, interruptions
and abrupt topic shifts, all initiated by the doctor, 2 whereas the
psychological interviews involved no such intervention by the
In the "exploratory" (diagnostic) psychological
interviewer.
interview, the interviewer simply sought further information and
In the
clarification of topics introduced by the patient."
"collaborative" (diagnostic and treatment) psychological interview,
the interviewer's predominant mode of participation was to
paraphrase what the patient said, (as a way of getting the patient
actively involved in the formulation of the problem being
treated).74
Thus, in the medical interview, the doctor takes the patient's
information and challenges and clarifies it according to the
doctor's own agenda of symptoms and causes. This filtering and
clarifying by the doctor cannot help but enhance the accuracy of
the information provided by the patient. Additionally, if the
patient is not aware at the outset of the doctor's need for accurate
information, he certainly learns this from the dynamics of the
interview.
The mental health professional, on the other hand, is not
primarily interested in eliciting accurate information from the
patient, at least not about the non-symptom facts underlying the
patient's perceived problem. Far more important to mental health
treatment than an accurate description of people and events is the
patient's willingness to disclose and explore his feelings about
those things, and that requires the establishment of a trusting
relationship with the patient. 5 "A warm, personable and confiding
relationship is a significant therapeutic factor common to virtually
all forms of counseling and psychotherapy."76 In other words, the
70. See generally HALLECK, supra note 18 (intended for medical students
and psychiatric residents); SOMMERS-FLANAGAN, supra note 69 (intended for
psychology students); LUCAS, supra note 69.
71. Tony Hak & Fijgje de Boer, Formulations in First Encounters, 25
JOURNAL OF PRAGMATICS 83 (1996).

72. Id. at 85-88.
73. Id. at 88-91.
74. Id. at 91-96.
75. SOMMERS-FLANAGAN, supra note 69, at ch. 5.

76. Hak & de Boer, supra note 71, at 102-3; see also ESSENTIAL
PSYCHOTHERAPIES (Alan S. Gurman, Stanley B. Messer, eds., 2d ed., The

Guilford

Press

2003)

(describing

twelve

psychotherapies:

traditional
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efficacy of treatment will depend to a significant degree on the
ability of the clinician to establish and maintain that kind of
relationship with the patient. Such a relationship is universally
acknowledged to assist the patient in disclosing and confronting
the causes of the illness, although the mechanism by which this
happens is characterized in different ways by the different schools
of therapy (e.g., as "transference" in psychoanalytic therapy," as
"trustworthiness" in some behavioral therapies" and as
"mutuality" in feminist therapy79 ). As a result of this focus on the
clinician-patient relationship, the mental health interview is
characterized by the clinician asking the patient to expand on his
story and asking for more information on the patient's
contextually grounded experiences of events. ° The patient's
description of the people and events that he perceives to have
caused or contributed to his problem, far from being subject to the
probing of the medical interview, is ordinarily not questioned by
the mental health clinician: The inquiry here is into the patient's
feelings about those people and events.8 In fact, counseling texts
specifically warn against jeopardizing the relationship by
challenging the patient's version of the problem in early
82
interviews .
This is not to suggest that a psychotherapist will never
question a patient's statement of the facts. Although most
therapists assume truthfulness on the part of patients and do not
attempt to detect or challenge factual inaccuracy,' there have
been some alarms sounded regarding deception by patients.'
psychoanalytic treatment,
relational
approaches to psychoanalytic
psychotherapy,
person-centered
psychotherapy,
existential-humanistic
psychotherapies, behavior therapy, cognitive therapy, postmodern approaches
to psychotherapy, integrative approaches to psychotherapy, brief
psychotherapies, family therapies, marital therapies, group psychotherapies).
77. SOMMERS-FLANAGAN, supra note 69, at 114.

78. Id. at 124-26.
79. Id. at 127-30.
80. Hak & de Boer, supra note 71, at 89.
81. One of the goals of the psychological interview is to enable the clinician
to complete a "mental status exam," which requires information about the
patient in categories like the following: appearance, behavior/psychomotor

activity, attitude toward interviewer, affect and mood, speech and thought
perceptual disturbances, orientation and consciousness, memory and
intelligence, reliability, judgment and insight. The focus is on evaluating the
patient's cognitive processes, not the accuracy of the facts he recites.
SOMMERS-FLANAGAN, supra note 69, at 214-38.
82. See, e.g., LUCAS, supra note 69, at 2 ("If you disagree with the client's

perception of the problem, this is not the time to say so.").
83. CLINICAL ASSESSMENT OF MALINGERING AND DECEPTION 1 (Richard

Rogers ed., The Guilford Press 1997).
84. See, e.g., EKKEHARD OTHMER & SIEGLINDE OTHMER, THE CLINICAL
INTERVIEW USING DSM-IV-TR: VOL 2: THE DIFFICULT PATIENT 315, 353-88

(American

Psychiatric

Publishing,

2002);

CLINICAL

ASSESSMENT

OF
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However, the primary concern of those voices has been the patient
lying about symptoms (malingering), not about precipitating
events, and it is the events, not the patient's symptoms, that are
likely to be most relevant in a subsequent trial. One of the few
texts that advocates challenging a patient's apparent deception
about non-symptom facts also acknowledges that it is difficult for
One would therefore
the therapist to pursue such a course.'
expect such challenges by the therapist to be relatively rare.
So, it would appear that the nature of the psychiatric
interview, based on the need to create and nurture a supportive
patient-therapist relationship and focus on the patient's subjective
experience of events and not on an accurate communication of the
events themselves, is far less likely than the typical medical
interview to instill in the patient a sense of the importance of full
and accurate disclosure of underlying, non-symptom facts. In
addition to that, the same reasons that bring the patient into
mental health treatment are themselves likely to inhibit the
patient from giving a complete and accurate description of
underlying facts.
2.

The Patient'sReluctance to Report Fully and Accurately

It is widely recognized among psychiatrists that psychiatric
patients are more likely than other medical patients to misreport,
through distortion, incomplete disclosure, or deliberate deception. 6
They may be motivated by distorted thinking due to their illness,87
by fear (of stigmatization or of mental illness itself) or, very
commonly, by a desire to avoid responsibility or humiliation. 88
MALINGERING AND DECEPTION (Richard Rogers ed., The Guilford Press 1997).
85. OTHMER, supra note 84, at 362-64. The authors suggest that patient
deception about events can only be detected when there is a divergence
between the patient's description and the patient's "genuine emotions" as
perceived by the therapist. Skillful deceivers can minimize such a divergence,
id. at 356, and health practitioners are reluctant to confront deception even
when they detect it, id. at 315-16.
86. HALLECK, supra note 18, at 4.
87. This does not refer to the serious distortions that characterize the
thinking of a patient suffering from psychosis or any other condition that
seriously impairs the patient's perception of reality. Those distortions (e.g.,
"God told me to kill him") are usually obvious or can be exposed through the
cross examination of the testifying therapist. The focus of this article is on the
ordinary patient in psychotherapy, whose condition may color his perception
(e.g., by inclining him to attribute malicious motives to certain of his
intimates), but does not seriously compromise his grasp on reality. However,
even this kind of low-level disturbance can motivate a patient to report events
inaccurately when the facts related by the patient have been filtered through
the patient's interpretation (e.g., "My boss humiliated me in front of the other
employees.").
88. Id. at 30-35; see also SULLIVAN, HARRY STACK, THE PSYCHIATRIC
INTERVIEW 218-24 (H.S. Perry and M.L. Gawel, eds., W.W. Norton & Co.,
1954) (describing how to handle anxiety in a psychiatric interview); Edward
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Psychotherapy often requires the disclosure of situations that the
patient believes will reveal previously hidden shortcomings, and
such disclosure can engender in the patient a feeling of shame."9
This would seem to be especially true in many of the situations
that might be relevant to future litigation, in which the patient's
statements might be offered in evidence, situations, for example,
involving sexual contact, violent relationships, child abuse or
neglect, job performance and even negligence.
The prevalence of communication-inhibiting feelings of shame
in mental health patients was confirmed in a recent British study
of people referred to psychotherapy by their primary care
physicians.9" The study, which was conducted immediately before
the patients entered psychotherapy, found that sixty-eight percent
of the emotions reported by the patients in the study had not been
disclosed to anyone else (compared to a non-disclosure rate of
about ten percent in similar studies of non-clinical samples of
respondents) and that the non-disclosure was highly correlated
with fear that disclosure of the emotional experience would make
the respondents feel shame or fear about how others might see
them.9 This could indicate that one of the reasons why people
enter psychotherapy is because of a predisposition not to disclose
such facts." If that is the case, it raises serious questions about
whether the information communicated by a patient in
psychotherapy, especially in the early stages of psychotherapy, is
likely to be complete or even entirely accurate. In addition,
mental health professionals acknowledge that the accuracy of a
patient's reporting can be very difficult to assess." In light of this,
the evidentiary reliability of the patient's statements to the
therapist looks even more questionable.
3. The Lack of an Obvious Connection Between Providing
Accurate Information and Receiving Symptom-Relieving Treatment
As already noted, the medical treatment hearsay exception is
based on a belief that the patient is motivated to speak truthfully
and accurately to a clinician because he recognizes that the
clinician must have accurate information to be able to provide a
correct diagnosis and appropriate treatment. The patient seeking
M. Weinshel, Some Observations on Not Telling the Truth, 27 J. AM.
PSYCHOANALYTIC ASS'N 503 (1979).

89. HALLECK, supra note 18, at 30-31.
90. See James Macdonald & Ian Morley, Shame and Non-Disclosure: A
Study of the Emotional Isolation of People Referred for Psychotherapy,74 BRIT.
J. MED. PSYCHOL. 1 (2001).

91. Id. at 1.
92. Over eighty percent of the participants in this study who discussed an
undisclosed emotional experience stated to the interviewer that non-disclosure
was "a recurrent or habitual pattern." Id. at 7.
93. See. e.g., OTHMER, supra note 84, at 319-21.
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treatment for an injury or an illness is typically experiencing pain
or other unpleasant symptoms and he will take care to be accurate
in describing the events leading up to the pain, because he wants
relief from those symptoms and understands that the doctor's
ability to provide relief depends on the doctor having a correct
understanding of the pain's cause. However, this connection
between the accurate reporting of non-symptom facts and the
quality of the resulting treatment is likely to be far less clear to
the patient who is providing such information to a mental health
clinician.
Even the patient who is voluntarily seeking treatment for
clearly acknowledged mental symptoms, such as depression or
anxiety, is unlikely to think that his treatment depends on his
providing the therapist with accurate and complete information
about the people or the events that the patient associates with
Unlike infection and injury, a mental or
those symptoms.
emotional problem seldom results from a clear, single-event cause
and treatment is rarely based on identifying such a cause.
Although the efficacy of mental health treatment does depend on
accurate information about symptoms, it does not depend
substantially on the accuracy of the patient's statements about the
events leading to the patient's distress.94 As we have seen, the
process of mental health treatment reflects this in the relative
absence of probing questioning by the clinician, the kind of
questioning that could help the patient make the connection
between accurate information and the relief of his symptoms. This
lack of obvious relationship between accuracy and symptom-relief
is especially problematic when, as noted above, the very condition
that brought the patient into therapy may motivate him to provide
incomplete and inaccurate information to the therapist. 95
This would presumably be even more the case with patients
whose submission to treatment is not voluntary. If the patient is
in mental health treatment because of a medical or court referral
or because of pressure from family or friends, the patient himself
may have neither a clear recognition of his symptoms nor much
desire to relieve them. The fact that the patient has been
compelled or pressured to seek treatment may even suggest a
motivation to give a self-serving version of the facts rather than an
accurate one, or to rebel against the circumstances by dissembling.
4. The Special Case of Statements Made in Treatment for Trauma
The lack of an obvious connection between the patient's
accuracy and the relief of symptoms creates a somewhat different
problem in evaluating the accuracy of statements made in mental

94. See supra notes 69-85 and accompanying text.
95. See supra notes 86-93 and accompanying text.
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health treatment after trauma.
Because of increased
understanding of the psychological effects of trauma, such as
serious beating or sexual assault, it has become common for the
emergency medical personnel who treat trauma victims' physical
injuries to screen and refer victims for psychological treatment.9
Thus, although the patient voluntarily enters mental health
treatment, his motivation for doing so often results from the
urging of the medical professional and not from his own
symptoms. In fact, he may not be experiencing what he recognizes
as psychological symptoms at all.
The most distressing
psychological symptoms of the trauma, which can include
flashbacks and dreams about the event, insomnia, irritability, poor
concentration, exaggerated startle response and fearfulness, are
associated with Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) and are
often delayed, sometimes occurring only weeks or months after the
traumatic event.97 The patient who is referred for mental health
treatment immediately after the trauma will most likely not be
seeking relief of those symptoms. That patient is more likely to be
experiencing an acute stress reaction (Acute Stress Disorder, or
ASD), which can manifest itself in a passive withdrawal or in
agitation and acute anxiety.98 Clinicians who encounter trauma
victims at this stage are taught to focus the interview on assuring
the client that his reaction is normal and on identifying needs for
safety, comfort, support and medical attention.9
They are
cautioned not to prompt the victim to talk about the trauma unless
he wishes to. °° While the patient is experiencing this stress
reaction, his processes of thinking and decision-making will likely
be impaired.10' In fact, one of the diagnostic criteria for ASD is
"dissociative amnesia" (the inability to recall an important aspect
of the trauma).' 2 Thus, the reliability of information he provides
about the traumatic event is likely to be diminished.
In the weeks and months following a trauma, some patients
will experience PTSD, the symptoms of which include a number of
96. In fact, treatment for sexual assault is often provided by a designated
team of professionals, including a nurse-examiner who is trained to assess
both physical and emotional trauma.
See, e.g., Commonwealth of
Massachusetts, Executive Office of Health and Human Services,
Massachusetts Sexual Assault Nurse Examiner Program,SANE Protocols for
Ages 12 and Above, 9 (2003).
97. AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL
MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS (-DSM-IV"), 426-29 (4th ed. 1994).
98. ANNE-MARIE
DOYLE
&
SUSAN
THORNTON,
PSYCHOLOGICAL
ASSESSMENT OF SEXUAL ASSAULT, IN THE TRAUMA OF SEXUAL ASSAULT:
TREATMENT, PREVENTION AND PRACTICE 99, 103-4 (Jenny Petrak & Barbara

Hedge eds., John Wiley & Sons 2002).
99. Id. at 104; see also SOMMERS-FLANAGAN, supra note 69, at 194-95.

100. DOYLE &THORNTON, supra note 98, at 104.
101. Id. at 103.
102. American Psychiatric Association, supra note 97, at 432.
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memory-distorting aspects, including psychic numbing, avoidance,
At this stage, the patient will
amnesia and hyperarousal."'
certainly be aware that he is experiencing serious symptoms and
will presumably be motivated to relieve them. However, now his
condition also makes him less able to provide reliable information
about the traumatic event. Questioning the patient about the
This may produce
trauma may cause him to re-experience it.'
acute distress on the patient's part, but it is unlikely to disclose
reliable information because in PTSD an apparently indelible
emotional memory (which compels the patient to re-experience the
stress of the event) coexists with impaired declarative memory
(which would ordinarily enable the patient to recall of the details
of the event.)."°' So, although the patient can reproduce the
emotions of the traumatic experience, his ability to remember the
details is impaired.' °
Trauma also damages its victims' capacity for trust,
impairing their ability to establish a supportive relationship with
a therapist. As a well known authority on trauma puts it, "The
patient enters the therapeutic relationship prey to every sort of
doubt and suspicion. She generally assumes that the therapist is
either unable or unwilling to help. Until proven otherwise, she
assumes that the therapist cannot bear to hear the true story of
the trauma."0 7 One would not expect a client in this state to be
motivated to give the therapist a full and accurate description of
events, even if she could.
Finally, even the patient who is not so traumatized as to be
suffering from these serious deficits, may feel that he has
contributed to causing the trauma itself (e.g., an automobile
accident, sexual assault by an intimate, domestic violence). If so,
feelings of shame or responsibility may motivate him to conceal his
contribution rather than to tell the full truth."°
103. Id. at 428-29; see also Bessel A. van der Kolk, The Body Keeps the Score:
Memory and the Evolving Psychobiology of PosttraumaticStress, 1 HARV. REV.
PSYCHIATRY 253, 254 (1994); DOYLE & THORNTON, supra note 98, at 110-11.
104. SOMMERS-FLANAGAN, supra note 69, at 194-95.
105. van der Kolk, supra note 103, at 258-61. This article explains the
physiological causes of PTSD, showing what parts of brain are implicated and
suggesting that the "emotional" memory may be permanently imprinted
(although its effect can be ameliorated with drugs) and that cognitive
evaluation of experience and semantic representation may be interfered with
by the same processes that create such vivid and long-lasting emotional
memories.
106. A diagnostic criterion for PTSD is "persisfent avoidance of stimuli
associated with the trauma," including "inability to recall an important aspect
of the trauma." American Psychiatric Association, supra note 97, at 428.
107. JUDITH LEWIS HERMAN, TRAUMA AND RECOVERY 138 (Basic Books
1992).
108. DOYLE & THORNTON, supra note 98, at 104-5; see also infra notes 113-

19 and accompanying text.
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Thus, to the extent that the "selfish treatment" motivation
depends on the patient recognizing that accurate information will
lead to relief of symptoms, that motivation is much less present in
mental health treatment than in physical treatment. Moreover, in
mental health treatment for trauma, the trauma itself appears to
add additional risks of inaccuracy.
5. The Inability to Verify the Patient'sVersion of Events
When a patient complains to a doctor of pain or of a physical
illness, the patient's body usually displays physical manifestations
of that condition. The doctor can observe the injury and can test
for elevated temperature, abnormal blood count and other
objective indicators that are consistent with the patient's
description of the condition and of its cause. This physical
evidence can be used to corroborate the patient's complaints, but it
can also expose inconsistencies, omissions and fabrications in the
patient's statements. The patient's knowledge that the doctor can
check his statements through this other evidence enhances the
patient's motivation to speak accurately and not to omit anything
that seems pertinent to his condition. This is an aspect of the
"selfish treatment interest" that increases the reliability of the
patient's statements and justifies admitting them into evidence in
spite of the hearsay rule.
The facts that are recited by the patient in mental health
treatment are ordinarily much less susceptible to verification by
the clinician. The symptoms of mental and emotional conditions
are far less likely than those of physical conditions to be reflected
in verifiable bodily changes. 19 Facts relating to the patient's
history (non-symptom facts) are also less likely to be verifiable, for
several reasons. First, the number of historical facts that are
pertinent to diagnosis or treatment is usually very large,"0 and not
all of them are equally important to the clinician. Second, some of
the important events described may be long past and could not be
verified easily even if the clinician wanted to seek objective
evidence of them."' Third, and most important, the mental health
professional, as we have seen, is not particularly concerned about
verifying the patient's description of underlying events, even
recent ones, because it is the patient's feelings about the events

109. This is not always true, of course. One of the symptoms of PTSD, for
example, is a heightened response to certain stimuli, especially reminders of
the trauma and intense neural stimuli, such as sudden noises. This response
can be reflected in increases in such physiological signs as heart rate, skin
conductance and blood pressure. van der Kolk, supra note 103, at 254-58.
However, the verification of symptoms through laboratory testing is seldom a

part of clinical treatment of mental or emotional conditions.
110. See supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text.
111. HALLECK, supra note 18, at 76.
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and not their objective reality that are seen as far more important
to the cause and the treatment of the mental condition.11 2 Unlike
the physician seeking clarification of a patient's physical
complaints, the mental health clinician is unlikely to jeopardize
the therapeutic relationship by probing or otherwise challenging
the patient's version of events.
The patient thus has no reason to think that his statements
will be subject to cross checking and he cannot have the enhanced
motivation to speak accurately that an expectation of crosschecking would provide.
6. The Self-Serving Nature of Many of the Patient'sStatements
There is a high risk that the accuracy of statements made in
mental health treatment may be distorted by self-serving
motivations of various kinds. It has already been noted that
situations discussed in mental health treatment often engender
feelings of shame in the patient.'
Those feelings can create a
need for self-justification which can be a powerful motive for
incomplete disclosure, or even fabrication."' This would seem to
be especially true of many of the situations that produce patient
statements that are relevant evidence in subsequent litigation
involving, for example, damages due to mental distress, violence
that may have been provoked or contributed to by the victimdeclarant (such as assault by an intimate), or other kinds of
alleged maltreatment (such as discrimination or harassment). In
all of these situations, the patient may well feel a need to convince
the clinician of the patient's own lack of responsibility or the
importance of the patient's feelings of injustice. That kind of
motivation is unlikely to produce reliable accounts of the
underlying events.
Exacerbating this risk of self-serving distortion is the fact
that the patient will ordinarily know that he has control over the
therapist's ability to repeat his statements. The therapist has a
professional obligation to preserve the confidentiality of most such
statements and, except in exceptional circumstances, to disclose
them only with the patient's permission."' Advising the patient of
that obligation is considered good therapeutic practice."6 It also,

112. See supra notes 75-85 and accompanying text.
113. See supra notes 86-93 and accompanying text.
114. See generally HALLECK, supra note 18.
115. AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, THE PRINCIPLES OF MEDICAL
ETHICS WITH ANNOTATIONS ESPECIALLY APPLICABLE TO PSYCHIATRY,

ANNOTATIONS TO SECTION 4 (2001); American Psychological Association,
Ethical Principles of Psychologists and Code of Conduct, STANDARD 4 (June
2003); Clinical Social Work Federation, Code of Ethics III (1997), American

Counseling Association, ACA Code of Ethics, SECTION B (2005).
116. American Psychiatric Association, supra note 115, at 4.
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however, lets the patient know that he is very unlikely to be called
to account for any inaccuracy in his statements, because the
therapist cannot repeat them to anyone who might be able to
verify or challenge them.
When patient statements are offered in evidence in a trial,
privilege law provides another vehicle for patient control and
should raise additional concerns about the accuracy of the
statements.
All states and the federal courts recognize a
psychotherapist-patient privilege not to disclose confidential
patient statements in a legal proceeding.1 7 The patient is the
holder of that privilege, and only the patient can waive it. Thus, a
patient who is aware of the privilege and who anticipates litigation
knows that he (or someone representing his interests) will be able
to decide whether his statements that were made in mental health
treatment will be offered at trial.'
This ability to shape the
evidence provides an additional incentive to report a self-serving
version of events to the clinician.
Statements made for treatment of a physical condition can, of
course, also be self-serving, but in view of the vastly wider galaxy
of facts that are "reasonably pertinent" to mental health treatment
and the generally weaker controls on the accuracy of the latter
statements, the risk of distortion by self-serving motivation seems
significantly higher in statements that are made in mental health
treatment. 9
None of this is to suggest that patients in mental health
treatment are generally untruthful or that truth-telling in the
clinician-patient relationship is of no importance. What it does
suggest is that the truth-telling motivation of a patient in
psychotherapy is far less likely to be enhanced by the conditions of
treatment than is that of the paradigmatic patient on which the
medical treatment hearsay exception is based - one who seeks
treatment of a physical injury or illness. If that is so, then the
patient's statements in psychotherapy do not carry the additional
117. See Jaffe v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1 (1996) (recognizing a federal
psychotherapist-patient privilege and acknowledging that all fifty states and
the District of Columbia already recognized such a privilege in some form); see
also id. at 12 n.11 (providing various state rules of evidence in which
psychiatrist-patient privilege is acknowledged).
118. Of course, there will also be situations in which the privilege does not
apply (e.g., when the patient speaks to a court-appointed mental health
professional). In those situations, however, the patient's statement is usually
offered against the patient and there is generally no need to resort to the
medical treatment exception to admit it since the patient's statement can be
admitted as an admission of a party opponent (if the patient is a party) or as a
statement against interest (if the patient is unavailable to testify) or, for the
limited purpose of impeaching the patient's testimony (if the patient testifies).
119. In addition, many jurisdictions, both federal and state, do not recognize
a general physician-patient evidentiary privilege, whereas all recognize a
psychotherapist-patient privilege.
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"guarantee of trustworthiness" that justifies the admission of
hearsay statements made for purposes of medical diagnosis and
treatment. Most people try to speak accurately in most contexts,
but the hearsay rule still applies to keep their out-of-court
statements out of evidence. The factual statements that patients
make to their mental health clinicians are no more likely than
those excluded statements to be accurate, and therefore they
should not escape the filter of the hearsay rule.
B. Statements Made in Anticipation of Mental Health Treatment
If a patient's statements that are made in the process of
treatment itself, when the "selfish treatment interest" is
presumably strongest, do not have the enhanced reliability that
the hearsay exception requires, one would expect even less
reliability in statements that the patient makes when the patient
is not in treatment. Yet, some courts have been willing to admit
such statements as "reasonably pertinent to psychological
treatment" even when the statements were made when the patient
was not being treated for mental or emotional complaints and thus
had little, if any, "selfish-treatment interest" in speaking
accurately.
This expansive use of the exception occurs most frequently in
cases involving a traumatic injury, such as an assault. In the
course of medical treatment for the resulting physical injuries, the
patient speaks with a medical professional (not a mental health
professional) and gives a description of the traumatic event. In a
subsequent trial, the medical professional offers to testify to what
the patient said about the event. The court, recognizing that parts
of the patient's description have no pertinence to the treatment
the patient was receiving, admits those statements anyway, on the
ground that the medical professional was also evaluating the
patient for referral to mental health treatment for the trauma.
A recent example of this treatment is State v. Woods,12°
decided by the Supreme Court of Washington in 2001. The
defendant was charged with a brutal murder and attempted
murder. 2 ' The trial court admitted statements of one of the
victims under the Washington version of Rule 803(4)."' The victim
had told an emergency room physician that she had been
awakened by the defendant, that he had hauled her out of bed,
showed her the body of her beaten friend and threatened to do the
same to her if she did not cooperate with him, that he had bound
another of her friends and she had heard a bat swing and hit that

120. 23 P.3d 1046 (Wash. 2001).
121. Id. at 1054.

122. Id. at 1066-69.
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friend in the head. 2 ' She recited the same facts to an emergency
room nurse who examined her later that day, adding that the
assailant had two knives.2 2 None of these facts was pertinent to
the treatment of her physical injuries. The victim later died in the
hospital. Although the victim had not received any mental health
treatment, the emergency room physician testified that he needed
to have an idea of what happened in order to arrange counseling,
"because people are going to have a certain amount of post
traumatic stress." 2' On the basis of this, the trial court admitted
the statements. The appellate court approved, observing that the
victim's being subjected to viewing the body of one friend and
hearing another being hit by a baseball bat were "reasonably
pertinent to an assessment of [her] need for counseling," and that
all of the statements the victim made to the emergency room
doctor and nurse were "reasonably pertinent to either immediate
physical or eventual psychological treatment" and were therefore
admissible under the medical treatment exception. 2 ' There was
no evidence that the victim herself was aware that her statements
related to her mental health treatment, or even that such
treatment was actually contemplated in her case. Since traumatic
experiences often result in psychological symptoms, it would seem
in the view of the Woods court that most statements describing a
traumatic experience of any kind should be admitted as pertinent
to psychological treatment, as long as they are made to a medical
professional. Other courts have used a similar rationale to admit
a victim's hearsay statements that were not pertinent to the
treatment actually being delivered. 27
123. Id.
124. Id. at 1069.

125. Id. at 1070.
126. Id. at 1069-70.
127. See, e.g., People v. Rogers, 780 N.Y.S.2d 393, 397 (App. Div. 2004)
(sexual assault victim's statements in hospital record, not pertinent to
treatment of physical injuries admissible because record "had a dual purpose

of investigation and treatment of the victim's potential physical and
psychological injuries," and "the history was germane to treatment." There is
no indication in the opinion that the victim-declarant was aware that her
statements would be pertinent to future mental health treatment); see also
State v. Janda, 397 N.W.2d 59 (N.D. 1986) (duty nurse at hospital where adult
sexual assault complainant was brought for examination after the alleged
assault was allowed to testify to several of the complainant's statements,

including that she had been attacked at her house by the defendant, who had
held her arms down and told her not to tell anyone. The admission was
approved because, although not pertinent to treatment of the complainant's

physical injuries, such facts as the location of the attack, the kind and degree
of restraint, and the imposition of fear through an admonition not to tell
anyone, were all reasonably pertinent to psychological treatment and "[iun

addition to diagnosing and treating such physical injuries as cuts and bruises,
health care providers examining one claiming to be the victim of a sexual
assault must diagnose whether or not the alleged victim has suffered
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In cases where traumatic injury has been inflicted upon the
victim, the victim's out-of-court statements of important facts,
such as the perpetrator's identity or the circumstances of the
assault itself, are often the most probative evidence available, and
a court's desire to admit them is understandable. But they are
hearsay, and they often arise in situations that raise concerns
about the accuracy of the victim's perception and memory... or the
self-serving motivation of the victim. 9 They should not qualify for
admission under the medical treatment exception. If the patient is
not aware that his statements are pertinent to some kind of
medical treatment, he does not have the selfish-treatment motive
to speak accurately.
Without that reliability-enhancing
motivation, the medical treatment exception should simply not
apply. When the patient relates to a medical professional such
facts as the identity of the attacker, the location of the attack and
a description of the attack, the patient has no way of knowing that
those facts are pertinent to the patient's mental health treatment
unless the medical professional makes that clear. There is no
indication that such an explanation was offered in any of the cases
admitting statements of that kind. Unless he knows that the
accuracy of his account is pertinent to his treatment, the patient's
motivation to speak accurately is no different than if he were
speaking to a police officer or another investigator, and the
hearsay rule does not provide an exception for a statement made
in those circumstances.
One could argue, of course, that the patients in these cases
knew that they were being treated for physical injuries and
probably assumed, because of the context, that this information
was also pertinent to that treatment, thus motivating them to
speak accurately when providing it. But that reasoning would
make virtually any statement made in medical treatment
admissible, and the requirement that the statement be
"reasonably pertinent" to the treatment would be rendered
meaningless, as would the cautionary requirement, applied by
some courts, that the statement not only be motivated by the
patient's desire to promote treatment, but that doctors reasonably
rely on that sort of information in providing that treatment. 30

psychological trauma and, if so, its nature and extent and treat that as well.")
128. Trauma can distort the memory of such a patient, and this is an
additional reason for caution in dealing with the patient's hearsay statements
shortly after the traumatic experience.
See supra notes 96-108 and
accompanying text.
129. For example, in Rogers, Woods, and Janda, the victim-declarant and
the defendant were acquainted before the assault. A preexisting relationship
should always raise questions of the declarant's motivation in describing the

incident.
130. See, e.g., Iron Shell, 633 F.2d at 83-84.
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For these reasons, statements made during medical diagnosis
or treatment should not be admitted under the medical treatment
exception if they are not pertinent to the medical treatment being
provided, but only to the anticipated treatment, by someone else,
of the patient's mental health problems.
IV.

STATEMENTS MADE FOR THE PURPOSE OF DIAGNOSIS ONLY

Prior to the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence, the
medical treatment hearsay exception was normally applied only to
statements made for the purpose of obtaining treatment. 131 It was
generally agreed that when a patient consults a physician for
diagnosis only, without an expectation of subsequent treatment
(usually to obtain the physician's expert evidence at trial), the
patient's statements are not motivated by the selfish-treatment
interest in speaking accurately and therefore, are not sufficiently
reliable to be admitted under the hearsay exception. Rule 803(4)
of the Federal Rules of Evidence rejected that restriction. That
rule covers statements made for the purposes of medical diagnosis
or treatment, thus including statements made to a physician
consulted with no treatment purpose, but only for the purpose of
obtaining the physician's testimony.
The Advisory Committee's justification for this extension of
the exception was purely pragmatic. The Committee reasoned
that the testifying physician, who would ordinarily be offering an
opinion in the trial, could usually testify to the patient's
statements for the non-hearsay purpose of showing "the basis of
his opinion," the jury then being instructed that it could not
consider the patient's statements for their truth, but only to show
the information on which the expert's opinion was based.1 2 In the
Committee's opinion, the jury was unlikely to be able to make that
distinction and thus to confine those statements to that nonhearsay use, but would instead treat the statements as evidence of
the matter asserted in them. 133 Its solution was to allow the full
admission of the patient's statements by including them in the
hearsay exception of Rule 803(4)."' The Advisory Committee's
Note ends with the cryptic statement, "This position is consistent
131. FED. R. EVID. 803(4), advisory committee's note; see also 2 JOHN W.
STRONG, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE 284 (5th ed., West Group 1999)
("statements... made by a patient to a doctor consulted for treatment have
almost universally been admitted as evidence of the facts stated..
132. FED. R. EVID. 803(4), advisory committee's note.
133. See id. (describing the distinction called for as "most unlikely to be
made by juries").
134. It should be noted that this part of Rule 803(4) should be read to admit
the patient statements only if the examining medical expert actually testifies
and presents an expert opinion at trial. Otherwise the rationale for admitting
the statement (that the jury will hear it anyway as the basis of the expert's
opinion) does not apply.
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with the provision of Rule 703 that the facts on which expert
testimony is based need not be admissible in evidence if of a kind
ordinarily relied upon by experts in the field."'35 However, Rule
703 merely permits an expert opinion to be based on inadmissible
material. It does not allow that inadmissible material to be
presented to the jury. Rule 803(4), on the other hand, goes much
further and permits a court to admit, as substantive evidence,
otherwise inadmissible hearsay solely because it can be the basis
of the expert's opinion.'3
With the adoption by states of evidence codes based on the
federal rules, the extension of the medical treatment hearsay
exception to include statements made for diagnosis only has been
widespread. However, it has been subject to much scholarly
criticism'37 and has been rejected by some courts and
legislatures." 8 In addition, its rationale has been undermined by a
subsequent amendment to the Federal Rules of Evidence.
Effective December 1, 2000, Rule 703 was amended to provide that
otherwise inadmissible facts or data supporting an expert's
opinion are not to be disclosed to the jury "unless the court
determines that their probative value in assisting the jury to
evaluate the expert's opinion substantially outweighs their
prejudicial effect." 9 That provision would ordinarily prohibit the
disclosure of hearsay statements by the expert witness. However,
under Rule 803(4) such statements, if made by the patient, are not
"otherwise inadmissible" if made to a medical expert, even to a
non-treating one. Thus, the 803(4) hearsay exception for these
statements, which was justified because the statements could be
heard anyway as the basis of the expert's opinion, continues to
admit such statements even though they would now be much less
likely to be heard as the basis of the expert's opinion. Of all the

135. Id.
136. Judge Weinstein and Professor Berger interpret this language to reflect
a judgment that "a fact reliable enough to serve as the basis for a diagnosis is
also reliable enough to escape the hearsay objection." 5 JACK B. WEINSTEIN &
MARILYN A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 803.06[2], 803-41
(Joseph M. McLaughlin ed., 2d ed., Matthew Bender 1998). However, as
Professor Capowski has pointed out, as an argument for reliability this
interpretation ignores the likely bias of many experts who are employed by a
particular party to support a particular theory of the case. Capowski, supra
note 24, at 366.
137. See, e.g., Mosteller, supra note 6, at 281-83; Capowski, supra note 24, at
405-7; CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE UNDER

THE RULES, 835-36 (5th ed., Aspen 2004).
138. These states include Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, North Carolina,
Pennsylvania, Tennessee and Virginia. See Mosteller, supra note 8, 76-80
(discussing various state restrictions on hearsay rules). In addition, some

states have imposed a condition of "trustworthiness" (Mississippi and New
Hampshire) or "good faith" (New Jersey). See id.

139. FED. R. EVID. 703.
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experts who testify in modern trials, this unusual situation applies
only to medical experts, since no other experts have their own
hearsay exception.
The few reported cases involving adult statements made for
mental diagnosis only are strikingly inconsistent, perhaps
reflecting discomfort with the anomalous state of the rule. All of
them are criminal cases. In each of them, the criminal defendant
offered statements that he made in the course of an examination
for a psychiatric diagnosis, either to evaluate his competence to
stand trial or to support a defense of diminished capacity. In an
early case of this type, the Supreme Court of Nebraska held that
the state's version of Rule 803(4), although exactly the same as the
federal rule, did not permit the admission of exculpatory
statements made by an accused to a psychiatrist for the diagnosis
of a mental condition. ° Similarly, the Supreme Court of North
Carolina has upheld the exclusion of such statements under the
state's medical treatment exception (identical to federal Rule
803(4)) because the statements were made primarily for the
purpose of preparing for litigation," and the Supreme Court of
Montana has also refused to admit these self-serving diagnosisonly statements .2
The Supreme Court of Colorado, on the other hand, citing the
Advisory Committee's reasoning in Federal Rule of Evidence
803(4), from which the language of the Colorado rule was taken,

140. See State v. Hardin, 326 N.W.2d 38, 42-43 (Neb. 1982) In Hardin, the
defendant was convicted of murdering his wife, and the issue was whether the
trial judge had erred in refusing to give a manslaughter instruction. Id. The
only evidence potentially supporting a theory of manslaughter consisted of the
defendant's statements. These statements were made to a psychiatrist and a

psychologist, both retained to assess the defendant's mental state: he and his
wife quarreled immediately before he killed her. Id. The Nebraska Supreme

Court thought that the trial court had refused to grant the manslaughter
instruction because it regarded the experts' testimony as merely giving the
basis of their opinions of the defendant's mental state (a non-hearsay use) and

not as evidence of the facts stated to them by the defendant (a hearsay use).
Id. The Nebraska Supreme Court supported that view of the defendant's
statements, in spite of the "diagnosis or treatment" language of Neb. Rev. Stat.

sec. 27-803(3), a verbatim copy of federal Rule 803(4). Id.
141. See State v. Harris, 449 S.E.2d 462, 466-67 (N.C. 1994). In Harris,the

trial court excluded the murder defendant's statements, nine months after the
crime, to a defense-retained psychiatrist who testified that the defendant had
a passive, dependent personality. Id. The excluded statements gave a version

of the crime in which the defendant shifted the blame to another. Id. The
Supreme Court of North Carolina affirmed, distinguishing between diagnosis
for trial preparation and diagnosis with a view to treatment, and holding that

the former are not covered by the state's version (and verbatim copy) of
Federal Rule 803(4). Id.
142. See State v. Van Dyken, 791 P.2d 1350, 1360 (Mont. 1990) ("defendant

has no constitutional right to have these hearsay statements placed in
evidence").
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has held that such statements are admissible, as long as there is
evidence that the statements were reasonably pertinent to the
diagnosis and were relied on by the psychiatrist in arriving at an
expert opinion on the mental condition in issue."
In 2002, the
Supreme Court of Hawaii, taking the same position, held that it
was error under the state's version of Rule 803(4) to exclude the
audio portion of a defendant's videotaped reenactment of his role
in the crime (the killing of his ex-wife and her daughter) because
his non-treating consulting psychologist relied on the videotape in
diagnosing the defendant and testified that it was good practice in
the field of forensic psychology. 44
This inconsistency is a direct result of the abandonment by
the federal rule (and its state counterparts) of the previous
requirement that statements made to medical professionals must
be motivated by the selfish treatment interest in order to qualify
for exception from the hearsay rule. For all other exceptions in
Rule 803 a "circumstantial guarantee of trustworthiness" was
required and the selfish treatment motivation was the
circumstantial guarantee that qualified medical treatment
statements to be included in that rule. The situation in which
patient statements are made to a consulting expert - whether
medical or psychiatric - far from motivating the patient to be
truthful and accurate, invites distortion and untruthfulness. It is
no wonder that so many jurisdictions have been unwilling to admit
patient statements made in this "diagnosis-only" context. In view
of the 2000 amendment to Federal Rule of Evidence 703, Rule
803(4) should be amended to eliminate the admission of
statements made for purposes of diagnosis only.
V.

CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTIONS FOR REMEDIATION

Courts should discontinue the use of the medical treatment
hearsay exception to admit statements made by patients in mental

143. See King v. People, 785 P.2d 596, 597-604 (Colo. 1990) In King, the
defendant was convicted of the murder of his wife and her sister. Id. at 597.
At trial, a defense-retained psychiatrist testified that the defendant was
suffering from severe depression and "emotional overload" at the time of the

killings and had suddenly redirected his suicidal impulse to homicide. Id. at
598. The trial judge would not allow the psychiatrist to testify to the
statements of the defendant that underlay his opinion, describing how he
obtained the murder weapons with the intention of threatening to shoot
himself and that he did not intend to shoot his victims. Id. The Colorado
Supreme Court held that the statements should have been admitted under the
state's version of Rule 803(4) and expressly overruled a prior case that
imposed a requirement that the defendant offering such a statement must
independently establish that his motive in making the statement was
"consistent with the rationale behind of the rule" (presumably to guarantee
the trustworthiness of the statement). Id. at 603.
144. State v. Yamada, 57 P.3d 467, 481 (Haw. 2002).
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health treatment or in contemplation of such treatment. Such
statements are inherently unreliable because of the nature of
mental health treatment. The treatment itself invites the patient
to disclose a large number of non-symptom facts but the efficacy of
the treatment does not depend on the accuracy of those facts, and
the clinician, whose primary concern is to nurture a positive
relationship with the patient, does not challenge the patient's
version of those facts. In addition, the problems that bring
patients into mental health treatment often motivate them to
report such facts inaccurately or incompletely. Such a setting does
not give the patient a "selfish-treatment interest" to speak
truthfully and carefully when relating those facts to a therapist.
Without that motive, the statements do not have the "guarantee of
truthfulness" that would justify excusing them from the general
prohibition against hearsay.
Even if psychotherapy did engender a "selfish treatment
motive" in the patient, there would be no basis for assuming that
the motive - and the hearsay exception - would extend to
statements made in a general medical examination where the
doctor, but not the patient, knows that the statements might be
pertinent to the future diagnosis or treatment of a possible mental
health problem, for which the examining doctor is contemplating a
referral to a mental health clinician.
Finally, the exception should never be used to admit
statements made to a mental health professional who is consulted
for diagnosis only. Such a situation fails to create a "selfish
treatment interest" and often adds litigation advantage to the
patient's other motivations to communicate an inaccurate version
of relevant events.
Those abuses of the medical treatment exception could be
diminished, if not eliminated, by the following changes to Federal
Rule of Evidence 803(4):
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the
declarant is available as a witness.

Statements for the purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment.
Statements made for the purposes-of medical diagnosis or treatment
of a physical illness or injury and describing medical history, or past
or present symptoms, pain, or sensations, or the inception or general
character of the cause or external source thereof insofar as
reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment.
These changes would remove from the exception both
statements made for mental health treatment and statements
made for diagnosis only, whether of a physical or a mental
condition, without the intention of undergoing treatment.
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Ultimately, the changes should be made not only in the
Federal Rules of Evidence, but also in the Uniform Rules of
Evidence and in the state rules that are based on the language of
Federal Rule 803(4). Although this may sound like a vast
undertaking, it would probably be greatly advanced simply by
making this change in Federal Rule 803(4). Because of the
historic preeminence of the Federal Rules in establishing the scope
of modern evidence law on the state level, it seems likely that a
change in the federal rule would result in a similar change in
many of the rule systems that were modeled after the Federal
Rules.
These changes in the rule would restore the medical
treatment exception to the same footing as that of the other
hearsay exceptions in Rule 803, that is, statements that avoid the
hearsay prohibition because they "possess circumstantial
guarantees of trustworthiness sufficient to justify non-production
of the declarant
in person at the trial even though he may be
145
available.

145. FED. R. EVID. 803 advisory committee's note.

